It is not necessary at this early stage of inquiry into these events to speculate on the original rationale for the U.S. activities of the two Israeli Groups. A study of that question will best be undertaken in the course of the public inquiry. But a few thoughts may lend some perspective to the question.

It may be that originally the Israeli DEA Groups did little more than sell art (though illegally and in violation of their visas). Once the need or usefulness of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States became apparent to the Israeli government, it may have viewed these art salesmen and their vans as ideal groups and vehicles into which to insert sophisticated agents with telecommunications, wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment and intelligence expertise.

The vans in the operations of both Israeli Groups ¹²² were able to move about neighborhoods without raising undue concern. The "art students" in the Israeli DEA Groups were using their vans as sometime door-to-door salesmen. The personnel of Urban Moving Systems, the Mossad front, were ostensibly driving about northeastern New Jersey towns in their van (or vans) to help people move—a familiar suburban sight.

With ample room for personnel and electronic equipment, the vans were ideal vehicles for electronic eavesdropping. ¹²³ The extent to which Nice Systems, the Israeli wiretapping company for which Tomer Ben Dor worked (the Israeli with the reference to "DEA Groups" in his computer files) will be a matter for the public inquiry. Nice Systems was ideally suited to provide equipment and expertise to the Israeli New Jersey Group because its U.S. headquarters were located in Rutherford, New Jersey, near the center of the Group's operations (Map 3).

The future hijackers were frequent users of land lines and cell telephones and thus were ideal subjects for electronic surveillance. Mihdhar regularly telephoned a terrorist facility in the Middle East from the United States. ¹²⁴ Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were "constantly on their cell phones." ¹²⁵ Mohamed Atta made calls to Madrid from Coral Springs ¹²⁶ and used his cell phone to call lodging establishments in Florida. ¹²⁷ Ramzi Binalshibh, a plot leader based in Hamburg, frequently called Atta, ¹²⁸ Shehhi ¹²⁹ and Moussaoui ¹³⁰ from Hamburg. Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls from Florida ¹³¹ and Hanjour, Hazmi and other hijackers made 75 calls in two days ¹³² to locate apartments, flight schools and car rental agencies for the New Jersey hijackers (of the Pentagon Plane).

As to the Israeli DEA Groups' surveillance of the DEA, it is difficult if not impossible to learn from the public record, at this time, the precise nature of the information they were seeking from that agency. The DEA itself was not sure then, and it may not know to this day. The DEA had its own concerns about the Israeli DEA Groups relating to previous drug investigations, as noted above. Perhaps these concerns were well-founded. Perhaps the Israelis were using these units in part as a training ground (on our soil) for future agents, or were interested in learning the DEA's methods for tracking drug traffickers and their money, a potential source of funding for terrorist groups.

But in all likelihood the selling of art and (though far riskier) the DEA spying were covers for their more important work of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States. This activity appears ultimately to have led the Israelis to the future hijackers, and forced upon them unwelcome decisions as to how much, and when, they should tell the United States of what they had learned.